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Entrepreneurship is not a Binding 
Constraint on Growth and Develop-






It is often claimed that entrepreneurship is indispensable for economic growth and development. 
These claims are mostly generated by scholars working in the field of entrepreneurship and 
management studies. In contrast, development economics scholars seem to be less concerned 
about entrepreneurship in the development process Who is right? I show that the arguments and 
evidence marshalled so far fails to convincingly show that entrepreneurship is a binding 
constraint on development in the poorest countries. In development economics institutional 
weakness, not entrepreneurship, is considered by many to be a more binding constraint on 
development, especially over the long run. However, recent advances at the interface of 
entrepreneurship and development economics suggest that unpacking the ‘black box’ nature of 
institutions may benefit from incorporating an ‘entrepreneur’. Thus, even if entrepreneurship is 
not a binding constraint on economic development, it may still be worthwhile to study 
entrepreneurship in development as it may improve our understanding of the real binding 
constraints. 
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There is substantial poverty and inequality in the world. It is estimated that there are 
around 1.4 billion extremely poor people, with extreme poverty defined with reference 
to the international poverty line of US$1.25 per person per day (Chen and Ravallion, 
2008). Many of these live in countries labelled as ‘fragile states’, least developed 
countries (LDCs) and/or low income countries (Naudé et al., 2008; 2009). A country is 
classified as a low income country if its per capita income is less than $905 per annum. 
At present 53 states are classified as low income countries, of which 34 are located in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover within and between countries incomes and wealth are 
very unequally distributed. Consider for instance that the richest 10 per cent of adults in 
the world own 85 per cent of global household wealth. Of these individuals, almost half 
live in the US and Japan (see Davies, 2008; Naudé and McGee, 2009). 
What explains these disparities in wealth and incomes between countries and within 
countries? Many nowadays are convinced the answer is generally to be found in the 
workings of the ‘capitalist’ system (e.g. Baumol et al., 2007) and more specifically in 
entrepreneurship. For instance a recently edited text1 containing chapters by eminent 
scholars is entitled ‘Making Poor Nations Rich: Entrepreneurship and the Process of 
Economic Development’. As the title suggests, the answer to eradicating poverty lies in 
‘Entrepreneurship’. 
Claims for the economic development prowess of entrepreneurship abound. I have 
become somewhat of a collector of these claims. Take the following quotes as 
representative samples:  
‘Victor Hugo once remarked “You can resist an invading army; you cannot 
resist an idea whose time has come”. Today entrepreneurship is such an idea’ 
(The Economist, 14 March 2009, supplement: 6). 
‘…all economics textbooks talk about the importance of entrepreneurship’ 
(Baumol, 2008: 2). 
‘An enduring claim in the field of entrepreneurship is that entrepreneurial 
activity promotes economic growth and development’ (Minniti, 2008: 779). 
‘…entrepreneurship has been increasingly considered as an important tool for 
economic growth and innovation across economies, regardless of stage of 
economic development’ (Acs et al., 2008: 265). 
‘Entrepreneurship is the main vehicle of economic development’ (Anokhin et al. 
2008: 117). 
‘Entrepreneurship is considered to be an important mechanism for national 
economic development’ (Hessels, 2008: 9) 
‘Entrepreneurship has come to be perceived as the engine of economic and 
social development throughout the world’ (Audretsch et al., 2006: 12).  
 
                                                 
1 See  Powell  (2008). 2 
 
‘…the more entrepreneurs there are in an economy, the faster it will grow’ 
(Dejardin, 2002: 2). 
‘The engine of economic growth is the entrepreneur’ (Holcombe, 1998: 60). 
And so on. What is striking about these claims is that they are largely made in the field 
of entrepreneurship, which had developed as a subdiscipline of management only fairly 
recently. Herein the main concern is not on development, but rather in understanding 
the process of entrepreneurship. As admitted by Audretsch et al. (2007: 1–2) 
‘management—the academic discipline most squarely focused on entrepreneurship—
has typically not considered the implications for the broader economic context’.  
In contrast, the discipline dealing with economic growth and development of developing 
countries proper, the field of development economics, seems to have been less 
concerned about entrepreneurship in the development process. In Section 3 of this paper 
I will go into greater depth into the contributions of key thinkers in development 
economics and substantiate this statement. However for now I can point out that 
prominent development economics textbooks such as the four-volume ‘Handbook of 
Development Economics’ and the ‘Leading Issues in Development Economics’ do not 
contain a single chapter or any substantial section on entrepreneurship. A number of 
authors have remarked (some even lamented) on this apparent ‘absence’ of the 
entrepreneur from development (Lingelbach et al., 2005; Naudé, 2008).  
If my broad and perhaps slightly stylized description of the current academic 
entrepreneurship-and-development-landscape contains some accuracy, then the 
potentially disturbing implication is that either those in the field of entrepreneurship 
who extol the developmental impact of entrepreneurship have it all wrong, or that those 
in the field of development economics are missing a fundamental ingredient of the very 
process they are so concerned about.  
In this paper I suggest that both of these implications may be (partly) true. First I will 
argue with reference to key thinkers in development economics that entrepreneurship 
has not really been ignored, but that development economists have weighed the 
entrepreneur and found him or her too light. To be specific, development economists 
generally do not consider entrepreneurship to be a binding constraint on development. 
Second, I will show that despite their claims in favour of the economic development 
prowess of entrepreneurship, the case in the entrepreneurship literature is on very shaky 
foundations—both conceptually as well as empirically. Indeed, entrepreneurship 
scholars may actually implicitly be concurring with development economists that 
entrepreneurship per se is not the binding constraint on development. 
However, even if entrepreneurship is not a binding constraint on development in the 
poorest countries, development economists may have underestimated the potential 
usefulness of studying entrepreneurship closer. This may indeed be the case if one 
considers the potential role of the entrepreneur in explanations of the role of 
institutional features in economic development. Institutions are often treated as a ‘black 
box’ (Chang, 2007). Entrepreneurship may help in clarifying this ‘black box’ 
explanation for development outcomes. Just because entrepreneurship may not be a 
binding constraint, it does not imply that its explicit incorporation into development 3 
 
economics cannot contribute to a better understanding of the way in which institutions 
affect economic development. 
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. In the next section I briefly define 
’development economics’, ‘binding constraints’ and ‘entrepreneurship’. In Section 3 I 
argue that the development economics literature has indeed weighed entrepreneurship 
but found it wanting. Then in Section 4 I show that despite its professed belief that 
entrepreneurship matters for growth and development, the entrepreneurship literature is 
still not able to provide convincing explanations and empirical evidence to show that 
entrepreneurship matter for the poorest countries. In Section 5 I ask whether perhaps 
entrepreneurship may after all matter for economic growth and development if we 
unpack the ‘institutional black box’ explanations for economic development. I will refer 
here specifically to recent work undertaken by the World Institute for Development 
Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) on integrating entrepreneurship formally into 
main models of economic growth and development.2 Section 6 concludes. 
2  Concepts and Definitions 
For purposes of this paper the main concepts and definitions are that of development 
economics, binding constraints on development, and entrepreneurship. 
2.1 Development  Economics 
Development economics is the field within economics that is preoccupied with the 
causes and consequences of the economic development of the poorest countries. As I 
mentioned in the introduction, poverty and inequality are disturbing features of the 
modern world. Addressing the economic dimensions of such poverty and inequality, 
and explaining their differences across countries, has been the task of the discipline of 
development economics since its establishment as a distinctive subdiscipline in 
economics after the Second World War. It draws on the methods and body of 
knowledge of economics to explain the causes of poverty and inequality in less 
developed economies. Chenery and Srinivasan (1988: xi) noted that these explanations 
are ‘characterized by competing paradigms rather than a dominant orthodoxy’ and 
‘although the core concerns of development economics are clear enough, its outer 
boundaries are difficult to establish and essentially arbitrary’. 
As such there is, despite many convincing explanations and much progress in 
conceptualizing and measuring economic development, still no ‘unified field theory’ of 
economic development, nor a single, straightforward explanation of the process of 
economic development and the determinants of poverty and inequality. At present, a fair 
assessment of the state of the subdiscipline is that it recognizes the importance of 
context, of history, of path dependency, and of the role which good institutions and 
governance play in the making of good development policies. Indeed, in terms of its 
                                                 
2 http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/projects-by-theme/development-and-
finance/en_GB/entrepreneurship-and-development/ as well as the special issue of Small Business 
Economics Journal, 34, forthcoming January 2010) devoted to the integration of entrepreneurship into 
models of economic development and growth.  4 
 
emphasis on institutions it has potentially a common area of interest with the rise of 
institutional thinking in entrepreneurship.  
It also has a strong tradition of attempting to formalize these into theoretical constructs 
based on microeconomic optimization behaviour and of subjecting these to empirically 
rigorous testing. It has often been remarked that a possible reason for the lack of interest 
in entrepreneurship in development economics is due to the difficulty of formally 
modelling a potentially vague concept such as entrepreneurship and due to the lack of 
adequate and consistent measurement of entrepreneurship. It has also been claimed that 
development economics’ formal models could see no need for entrepreneurship as they 
assumed perfect information and market clearing. While perhaps true earlier on, this is 
no longer a valid argument, as development economists have for some time now been 
assuming imperfect completion and non-market clearing. Indeed, overcoming definition 
and assumption difficulties. Gries and Naudé (2010) show that entrepreneurship can be 
usefully incorporated into endogenous growth models with microeconomic optimization 
behaviour.  
Within development economics ‘development’ involves both an increase in real output 
per capita, as well as in a structural transformation of the economy, from rural, 
agriculturally-based to being mainly urban- and industrial-based. In addition, 
development economics is concerned that such development should be equitable and 
sustainable, that is it should be shared (inequality should not increase) and not be 
environmentally destructive (see e.g. Seers, 1972; 1979). 
Where entrepreneurship scholars engage with development, their concept of 
development is more restricted—most often only to economic growth, GDP per capita 
or employment/productivity growth. They almost never consider poverty/welfare and 
inequality, and only very rarely the structural transformation of a society.3 Also, where 
the entrepreneurship/management literature do take note of structural transformation it 
often stems from Schumpeter’s notion of innovation which leads to ‘creative 
destruction’ and which underlies economic dynamics—and as such focuses on 
associating entrepreneurship with innovation. It sometimes also stems from a simple 
taxonomy of different ‘stages’ of development, wherein each stage has by implication a 
different structure. The foremost example of such a taxonomy in the management 
literature is Porter’s (1990) claim that development goes through three stages namely a 
factor-driven stage, a efficiency-driven stage and an innovation-driven stage (see also 
Porter, 2004 for a recent application).  
In adhering to Porter’s (1990) taxonomy however, entrepreneurship scholars may be 
doing themselves a disfavour as far as their claims for the centrality of entrepreneurship 
in development is concerned. This is because (a) all of the requirements for moving 
from one stage to another either involves coordination or market failures which needs to 
be overcome by a strong, efficient government, implying that entrepreneurship is not the 
                                                 
3  One purpose of the UNU-WIDER project on entrepreneurship and economic development was to 
consider the neglected relationship between entrepreneurship and welfare, inequality and structural 
transformation. Three papers from the project in this regard are Gries and Naudé (2010), Kimhi 
(2010) and Tamvada (2010).  5 
 
binding constraint, and (b) their association of entrepreneurship with innovation as per 
Schumpeter also clearly then suggest that entrepreneurship only drives growth in the 
final stage of development and is as such not a driver (or constraint) in the earlier two 
stages (many development economists would object to this).  
Entrepreneurship scholars also leave themselves vulnerable by using what is essentially 
a taxonomy to make causal claims, and indeed a taxonomy for which actually very little 
empirical support can be marshalled. Consider for instance that the innovation stage is 
supposed to be characterized by ‘decreases in the share of manufacturing in the 
economy’ (Acs and Szerb, 2009: 5). Despite this requirement the share of 
manufacturing in the USA (one of the most advanced and innovative economies on any 
measure) has been constant at around 22 per cent for more than 30 years. And many 
poor countries do indeed seem to have important elements of being innovation driven: 
Brazil is a global pioneer in bio-fuel technology and in a poor country such as India 
(with only 8 per cent of the per capita income of the USA) high growth rates in excess 
of 6 per cent per annum have been driven by innovation in ICT (Mani, 2008). The same 
could be said of China, one of the world’s largest and fastest growing economies: 
almost half of all innovative new goods imported by the USA come from China (Puga 
and Trefler, 2008), a country neither noted for its entrepreneurial or capitalist culture, 
not for its freedom, liberties, or clear property rights, that are advocated in books such 
as Making Poor Nations Rich advocate.  
2.2  Binding Constraints on Development 
By binding constraints I mean constraints on economic growth and development which, 
if relieved, would have a more significant impact on promoting growth and 
development than other constraints. Binding constraints, as long as they remain in place, 
would hinder growth, even if other possible constraints or determinants of growth are 
addressed.  
The idea of constraints that are ‘binding’ is of course to be find in some of the earliest 
thinking in development economics, for instance as in Albert Hirschman’s (1958) 
advocacy of ‘unbalanced’ growth wherein he advocated that governments should 
identify and support leading sectors, which are those with the most forward and 
backward linkages in the economy. It is also implicit in the literature on poverty traps, 
whereby processes out of poverty often follow non-linear dynamics, with threshold 
effects that would require external intervention in a certain area to ‘push’ a household or 
country over the threshold (see e.g. Murphy et al.,1989). 
More recently the idea of binding constraints have been given further emphasis by 
Hausmann et al. (2005: 2) who argue that coming up with long washing-lists of policy 
prescription for governments to promote growth is unpractical: 
‘...it is seldom helpful to provide governments with long lists of reforms, many 
of which may not be targeted at the most binding constraints on economic 
growth. Governments face administrative and political limitations, and their 
policy-making capital is better employed in alleviating binding constraints than 
going after too many targets all at once. So growth strategies require a sense of 
priorities’. 6 
 
Put this way, asking whether or not entrepreneurship is a binding constraint on 
economic growth and development is to ask whether it should be a priority in the 
growth strategies of the poorest countries. The discussion in Sections 3 and 4 suggests 
not. 
2.3 Entrepreneurship 
While there are many definitions of entrepreneurship, and it is studied in many different 
disciplines, the conceptual definitions at least have little suggestion or implication that 
entrepreneurship may be important for economic growth and development—indeed in 
some cases quite the contrary.  
A widely used definition sees entrepreneurship as the ‘discovery and exploitation of 
opportunities’ (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). This is very broad, and does not imply 
that the ‘discovery and exploitation of opportunities’ may influence national economic 
development outcomes. Some definitions more narrowly see entrepreneurship as the 
utilization of opportunities through the creation of new business firms. Accordingly 
Hart (2003: 5) defines entrepreneurship as the ‘process of starting and continuing to 
expand new businesses’. There is a fundamental belief amongst many entrepreneurship 
scholars, and I suspect this due to Schumpeter, that the most distinguishing task of the 
entrepreneur is to innovate. New businesses are therefore seen as the way in which 
entrepreneurs bring new innovations to market. As I have pointed out in the previous 
section, the equation of entrepreneurship with innovation under the (mistaken) view that 
innovation-driven growth is only possible at an advanced stage of development leads to 
the inevitable conclusion that entrepreneurship is not a driver of growth in poor 
countries, and that levels and activities of entrepreneurship should be higher the higher 
the stage of a country’s development.  
Entrepreneurship is however not only concerned about new firms. Many have applied 
the idea that entrepreneurs exploit opportunities in the firm context to argue that 
entrepreneurship is in fact part of the management function within existing firms (Hitt et 
al., 2001) and to coin the term ‘intrapreneurship’, which is the ‘pursuit of creative or 
new solutions to challenges confronting the firm’ (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2001: 495). 
Again, valid definitions in their own right, but no implications for national economic 
growth and development.  
More recently some within the entrepreneurship field have argued that entrepreneurship 
needs not exclusively or predominantly be concerned with new firm creation or 
behaviour within firms. An oft-quoted definition of entrepreneurship in this regard is by 
Baumol (1990: 987) who defines entrepreneurs as ‘persons who are ingenious and 
creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth, power, and prestige’. From this he 
draws the implication that not only may there be no relation between entrepreneurship 
and economic growth, but that entrepreneurship may have a negative impact on 
economic growth and development.  
Henrekson (2007: 719) in a similar vein proposes that ‘entrepreneurship can be seen as 
a continual quest for economic rents, i.e. rates of return exceeding the risk-adjusted 
market return’. He describes (2007: 729) the sources of ‘Ricardian’ rents (and their 
short term equivalents of ‘Marshallian’ rents) such as access to natural resources, 7 
 
patents, and tacit knowledge, and points out that these rents can be obtained through 
many different means: from innovative activities to bribes.  
For present purposes this may be an important implicit acknowledgement from the 
entrepreneurship field that entrepreneurship may not be a binding constraint on 
development. For as pointed out by Coyne and Leeson (2004: 236), the fact that rents 
are attached to activities that may be productive or destructive strongly suggests that 
underdevelopment may perhaps not be due to an insufficient supply of entrepreneurs, 
but rather due to a ‘lack of profit opportunities tied to activities that yield economic 
growth’. 
3  Development Economists on Entrepreneurship: Weighed But Found Wanting? 
In the previous section I dealt with the definitions and concept of ‘entrepreneurship’. 
This is somewhat distinct from the roles that are often ascribed to entrepreneurs. It is 
often based on these roles that scholars argue that entrepreneurship matters for 
economic growth and development. For instance, the roles of entrepreneurs may include 
everything from the reallocation of resources from low productivity uses towards higher 
productivity uses (Estrin et al., 2006), assuming risk, to the provision of diversity, 
goods, and services, as well as providing an environment for learning, experimentation, 
innovation, and competition (Sternberg and Wennekers, 2005).  
Development economists’ views have tended to be that this may amount to a ‘cover up’ 
explanation for an important economic phenomenon, by ascribing it to an 
‘entrepreneur’. Thus many would be unconvinced that entrepreneurs are essential to 
reallocate resources towards higher productivity uses, citing many instances where the 
opposite has occurred—not only in developing countries, but most recently as the 
subprime crisis in the US has shown.  
And whereas development economists would recognize the importance of job creation, 
risk-taking, learning, innovation, experimentation, and competition, they would see the 
provision of these goods and services as being the outcome of many different possible 
organizational forms (e.g. Sun, 2003). By seeing these as the outcome of individual 
‘entrepreneurship’ may obscure the many rich organizational forms through which 
human societies in different places and times have solved the provision of these goods.4  
Thus although entrepreneurs are fulfilling useful functions, the lack of entrepreneurs to 
fulfil these functions may not pose a binding constraint. Indeed, development 
economists recognize that there are large numbers of entrepreneurs in developing 
countries, many of them in the informal or survival sector. These entrepreneurs are 
however, no constraint on development, nor a significant driver of growth (Beck et al., 
2003) although they do alleviate poverty (Berner et al., 2008). Rather, many 
development economists see them as a symptom of other constraints in the economy 
(see e.g. De Paula and Scheinkman, 2007; Ihrig and Moe, 2004; Maloney, 2004), and 
                                                 
4  For instance as is illustrated in the volume edited by Liaxiang Sun ‘The claim that private investors 
should own the firm is not the logical consequence of free markets and free enterprise’ (Sun, 2003:  
1–2). 8 
 
Banerjee and Duflo (2007: 162) cautions that ‘it is important not to romanticize these 
penniless entrepreneurs’.  
If not entrepreneurship, then what are the views of development economists on the 
binding constraints to development?  
In Appendix Tables 1 to 3 I summarize the views of selected key contributors5 to 
development economics since its origins after the Second World War, thus between 
1940 and the present. These tables are only intended to provide a broad overview of 
some of the most notable contributions to the overall subject matter of development 
economics and is not meant in any way to be exhaustive of either the contributors or of 
their thinking.  
There are three tables in the Appendix, each corresponding to a broad stage in the 
evolution of development economics over this period. There is fair agreement in the 
literature that the field has gone through these three stages, which, following Meier and 
Rauch (2000: 421) and Nayyar (2008: 260) can be described as the 
(a) ‘Development Consensus’ phase from 1940 to roughly 1980.  
(b) ‘Washington Consensus’6 phase from 1981 to 2000. 
(c) The current post-Washington Consensus phase, 2000–to the time of writing.  
The three phases reflected in Appendix Table 1 to 3 are indicative of the fact that 
development economics as a discipline is characterized by different ideological 
viewpoints, and that the discipline evolved (and the dominating viewpoints) in reaction 
to actual economic outcomes. An excellent exposition of the phases of development 
thinking after the Second World war is contained in Szirmai (2005).  
Nayyar (2008) states that state-orientation after the Second World War was partly a 
reaction against the colonial legacy of free markets and the exploitation of natural 
resources. The ‘Development Consensus’ phase was, as Appendix Table 1 indicates, 
particularly concerned with the structural economic transformation of poor economies 
through industrialization. As column two implies, thinking about structural change, 
market failures, and international inequalities dominated thinking during this period. As 
a result the need for strong government intervention was promoted.  
                                                 
5  Any selection of ‘key contributors’ to a rich field such as development economics is likely to be 
subjective. In the present case I have been guided in my selection by the contributors recognized in 
recent overviews of the development of development economics, such as Chenery and Srinivasan 
(1988), Meier and Rauch (2000), Meier and Stiglitz (2001), Secondi (2008), Simon (2006) and 
Szirmai (2005).  
6  The term ‘Washington Consensus’ is meant to refer to a set of policy prescriptions for growth in 
developing countries which were associated mostly with the IMF and World Bank and related 
economists’ views, and which include adherence to fiscal and monetary discipline, liberalization of 
trade and financial markets, privatization of state-owned enterprises and enforcement of property 
rights (see also Baumol et al., 2007). These were the binding constraints on growth, which had 
become the main objective of policy, replacing the concern with structural transformation and 
inequalities. 9 
 
Some like Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) advocated a ‘big push’ on a number of fronts to 
overcome coordination failures in structural development. Others, like Hirschman 
(1958) advocated a more selective approach focusing on sectors with maximum 
linkages to the rest of the economy. In addition to government steering of the structure 
of the economy, this stage also witnesses the rise of the views that global inequalities 
exacerbates the plight of the poor nations, and that they are locked into the world 
economy at disadvantageous terms being subject to continually declining terms of trade 
(Prebisch, 1959; Singer, 1964). Given such an external environment, and given the 
imperatives of industrialization and urbanization, import protection measures were 
widely adopted. 
While not very often explicit at the times, the views about entrepreneurship and in the 
implications for the contribution of entrepreneurs is made in the last column of 
Appendix Table 1. This shows that during the first stage after the Second World War, 
entrepreneurship was not seen as a binding constraint (the only exception being 
Leibenstein, 1968 who did not really work within the field of development economics). 
Rather it is the lack of coordination and market failures, which keep countries 
underdeveloped and prevent structural economic change.  
While in most instances very few of the contributors focused explicitly on 
entrepreneurship, the notable exceptions are Harvey Leibenstein and Nathan Leff. Their 
positions on entrepreneurship contrasted. Leibenstein took the view that the supply of 
entrepreneurship may be inadequate given structural market imperfections in 
developing countries. However, it was Leff’s view who more accurately reflected the 
stance of development economics during this period towards entrepreneurship. In his 
words, ‘entrepreneurship is no longer a problem’ or a ‘relevant constraint on the pace of 
development’ in developing countries Leff (1979: 51).  
Leff (1979) qualified this opinion by pointing out that if indeed entrepreneurship had 
ever been lacking in developing countries in the past, it had during the intervening years 
been so successful that this very success had created problems which are now 
constraining development (this might sound familiar to readers in 2009 when global 
growth is being constrained by the very ‘success’ of entrepreneurs in financial markets). 
Amongst the problems which Leff (ibid.) noted were the rise of ‘oligopoly capitalism’ 
and growing inequalities in incomes and wealth. Thus successful entrepreneurship in 
developing countries ‘has led to serious economic distortions… [developing countries] 
have taken factor-market imperfections and transmuted them into product market 
imperfections’ (ibid.: 55).  
The implication from Leff’s (1979) argument is that whereas entrepreneurship is not a 
binding constraint on development, the way in which it may interact with institutional 
features may constrain development, with latter posing the real constraints.  
By the early 1980s the pendulum in development thinking started to swing in the 
opposite direction. The period between 1980s and 2000 has been described as the period 
of the ‘Washington Consensus’. Some key contributors during this era are listed in 
Appendix Table 2. From the summary of their ideas, it can be seen that the core theme 
of this period has been a concern with the role of the state. In particular, the view that 
the role of the state may be harmful (‘dirigisme’ as Deepak Lal, 2006 calls it) gained 10 
 
ground (although as the contributions of for e.g. Stiglitz and Olson suggest, this was far 
from universal). 
This view and its policy advice (applied by the Washington DC-based Bretton Woods 
institutions) for rolling back the state and liberalization of markets was a reaction to the 
perceived failure of state-led structural transformation, the perceived success of East 
Asia through market-oriented policies,7 the debt crisis (which delivered many countries 
to the IMF and World Bank) and the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
During the Washington Consensus phase, the concern was also more on economic 
growth, and less with structural changes. To an extent this was influenced by the need 
which many developing countries had for stabilization and growth, following the debt 
crisis and the recessions of the 1970s and early 1980s.  
As far as entrepreneurship was concerned, this was probably the period in the evolution 
of development economics when there seems to have been the greatest trust in markets 
and in entrepreneurs. However, as earlier, the implicit view was not that 
entrepreneurship is a binding constraint, rather, the state was seen as creating obstacles 
in the way of entrepreneurship. These included opportunities for rent-seeking and 
corruption (Bhagwati, 1982), government interference in markets (such as tariffs and 
state-run enterprises) (Lal, 1983) and weak governance (Olson, 1996).  
There is still today, even after a reaction had set in against the Washington Consensus 
proper, a strong tradition in entrepreneurship and management which subscribes to this 
notion. Elsewhere (Naudé, 2009a) I described this tradition with the phrase ‘Out with 
the Sleaze, In with the Ease’, meaning rolling back the state and limiting opportunities 
for corruption, rent-seeking, and state capture (the ‘sleaze’), and reducing the perceived 
obstacles in the start-up and running of business firms so as to make it easier to ‘do 
business’ (the ‘ease’). Altenburg and von Drachenfels (2006) describe this as the ’new 
minimalist approach’ to private sector development. 
The Washington Consensus’ emphasis on property rights reflect the views that states are 
predatory, and that good governance and good ‘institutions’ mean that the power of the 
state need to be curtailed. Institutions are therefore, in the words of Deepak Lal (2008: 
xi), a key proponent of liberalization and markets, ‘the means to constrain the self-
seeking instincts that we are endowed with as part of our basic human nature.’ Property 
rights, contract enforcement, the rule of law and personal freedoms are widely seen as 
‘good’ institutions. Institutions can also refer to societal beliefs and attitudes, what 
Deepak Lal terms material and cosmological beliefs.  
Taking a historical view, he believes that the countries of Western Europe outstripped 
other world regions in terms of development from the Middle Ages onwards as a result 
of changes mainly in material beliefs towards entrepreneurs. As argued by Lal (2008: 
xii)  
                                                 
7  But as Nayyar (2008: 262) said, Asia’s success was inaccurately interpreted as being due to free 
markets/liberalization and little government intervention whereas in fact it was due to the opposite.  11 
 
‘The material beliefs of all the agrarian Eurasian civilizations were inimical to 
the risk-taking and novel-seeking merchants and entrepreneurs...they were 
subject to constant predation by the state. It was due to the eleventh-century 
papal legal and administrative revolution of Pope Gregory VII that western 
Europe alone...broke from these dysfunctional material beliefs. The legal papal 
revolution created a church-state that protected property rights... This led to the 
Great Divergence, with the slow rise of the West from the twelfth century 
onward until it overtook the other hitherto richer Eurasian civilizations by the 
eighteenth century’. 
The essence of Deepak Lal’s argument is that entrepreneurship is not the binding 
constraint on development; rather it is material beliefs towards entrepreneurial risk-
taking and novelty seeking, and the underpinning thereof of a lack of ‘property rights’, 
which is the binding constraint on development. Loosening this constraint and 
according entrepreneurs more freedom is not only interpreted as having a defining 
impact on the rise of the West—indeed Lal sees this as the start of ‘capitalism’.  
The third phase of thinking in development economics is seen by many to have been 
heralded by Joseph Stiglitz when, in his UNU-WIDER Annual Lecture in 1998, he 
called for a move towards the ‘post-Washington’ Consensus (Stiglitz, 1998), see 
Appendix Table 3. The year 1998 was of course the year of the Asian Crisis, by which 
many of the Asian countries were worst affected and had more difficulties adjusting. It 
was those countries who had been more slavishly following the ‘Washington 
Consensus’.8 But even before the Asian Crisis, it was clear that the Washington 
Consensus had failed to deliver. As put eloquently by Nayyar (2008: 271): 
  ‘The second period from 1981 to 2005, the era of markets and globalization, 
witnessed economic liberalization and economic reforms across the board in 
developing countries…More openness and less intervention was the bottom-
line… There was also a profound change in the structure of incentives and 
institutions that reduced the role of the state to rely more on the market… There 
is now a growing recognition that the response to these reforms has been less 
than spectacular… Consider first the countries that were conformist…these 
liberalizers have under-performed or not performed. Some can even be 
described as dismal failures... Consider next the countries that were non-
conformist… These countries are now recognized as start performers in terms of 
economic growth’. 
If anything, these experiences have made many in development economics further 
convinced that entrepreneurship is not the binding constraint on development. 
Moreover, now the realization sunk in that entrepreneurship may not even be a positive 
                                                 
8  As noted by Szirmai (2005: 574) ‘After the Asian crisis a renewed debate broke out on the advantages 
and disadvantages of liberalisation and globalisation’. A substantial part of debate focuses on 
inadequacies in the global financial architecture. Soon after the Asian crisis, a debate also started in 
the development economics literature on the merits and demerits of aid (official development 
assistance), with a similar focus on the inadequacies in international aid architecture (see e.g. Easterly, 
2001; 2006; Sachs, 2005). The global economic crisis which erupted in 2008 has intensified both 
these debates (Naudé, 2009b).  12 
 
vehicle for growth in development given the outcomes during this period, which also 
included increases in global inequality. The proportion of the world’s population 
residing under the US$ 2-per day poverty stubbornly remained similar over this period.  
At the same time that the Washington Consensus dominated development thinking, and 
was implemented and/or promoted by the Washington-based institutions across the 
developing world, we saw a similar movement towards free markets, deregulation and 
economic liberalization throughout many advanced economies, most notably the USA. 
As Atkinson (2009) showed, by around 1976 the inequality in distribution of wealth in 
the USA was the lowest since the Second World War; however, since then this 
inequality has risen to its highest level ever. The number of rich and super-rich in the 
USA were by 2000 at unprecedented numbers. By the time of writing in 2009, this wave 
of deregulation and liberalization had resulted in two asset bubble crises in the USA, the 
2000 dot-com crisis and the 2007/08 subprime mortgage crisis (Naudé, 2009b). 
There is not yet a ‘consensus’ where development economics should go beyond the 
Washington Consensus (Nayyar, 2008). A number of current approaches find flavor 
seems to suggest that the pendulum is swinging back, at least partially, to reconsider the 
agenda of the first stage of development economics as unfinished. It is also broadening 
the scope to consider the role of geographical factors in economic development (for 
instance the 2009 World Development Report of the World Bank is devoted to 
Economic Geography) which often implies a role for government in the provision of 
transport infrastructure (see e.g. Naudé, 2009c) and in urbanization (Kanbur and 
Venables, 2005). Thus, the recognition is that the role of the state in development is 
important (Stiglitz, 1998) and that development is about more than just economic 
growth (Sen, 2000). As described by Stiglitz (1998: 24–25) in his 1998 UNU-WIDER 
Annual Lecture: 
  ‘The Washington Consensus policies were based on a rejection of the state’s 
activist role and the promotion of a minimalist, non-interventionist state. The 
unspoken premise is that governments are worse than markets. Therefore the 
smaller the state the better the state…[however] The state has an important role 
to play in appropriate regulation, social protection, and welfare. The choice 
should not be whether the state should be involved, but how it should be 
involved. Thus the central question should not be the size of the government, but 
the activities and methods of government’. 
It should be mentioned here that since the mid 1980s two methodological approached 
took root in the development economics field, one strongly microeconomic and the 
other more macroeconomically focused (see Rodrik, 2008). Both started to recognize 
the importance of ‘institutions’ in understanding diverse outcomes in diverse context. At 
first, the focus was, in line with the Washington Consensus, on property rights and good 
governance as ‘institutions’ (see e.g Acemoglu, 2003). However, more recently the 
concern has widened, with the recognition that a one-size fit all approach may be 
inappropriate. Harvard development economist Dani Rodrik’s 2007 book’s title reflects 
this view as ‘One Economics, Many Recipes’ (see Rodrik, 2007). This approach, whilst 
still recent, is unlikely to give entrepreneurship centre stage, although the recognition 
that there can be different binding constraints in different countries at different period 
may be giving a potentially more important, and previously unappreciated role to 
entrepreneurship. Thus Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) argue that the entrepreneur is 13 
 
important for a country to ‘discover’ what it is good at producing (even failing 
entrepreneurs have a value in signaling what activities may be profitable) and Iyigun 
and Rodrik (2004) argues that institutional and policy reforms could have negative 
impacts on growth if pre-existing entrepreneurial activity is strong, and vice versa.  
However, it does imply, through the need for ‘many recipes’ that there may indeed be 
cases where entrepreneurship is a constraint. But to understand whether and how this 
may be the case, we need to understand the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
institutions. And one prerequisite for this that we need to be able to better measure 
entrepreneurship. In the next section I show that entrepreneurship is not currently 
measured sufficiently for research to make much headway in this regard. I also show 
that the entrepreneurship field has failed to convincingly demonstrate that 
entrepreneurship is a binding constraint on growth in developing countries. 
4  Inconsistencies and Inadequate Evidence in the Entrepreneurship Literature: 
Is the Developmental Role of Entrepreneurship a Matter for Belief? 
Although the entrepreneurship, small business, and management literatures widely 
subscribe to the idea that entrepreneurship is important for economic growth and 
development, closer scrutiny of the field leads me to conclude that their case for 
entrepreneurship being an indispensable driver for economic development at least in 
developing countries is weak. 
For one, most of the concerns in this literature is not about development as such, but 
about economic growth. As pointed out earlier, there are important differences between 
them. Generally, the entrepreneurship literature has neglected economic transformation, 
structural change, and inequality, the ‘qualitative’ requirements that need to accompany 
growth for it to be development consistent. 
Second, despite the claims for the prowess of entrepreneurship for economic growth, 
there is somewhat of an inconsistency in the literature. A finer reading shows that 
conceptual models and empirical studies in entrepreneurship actually suggest that 
entrepreneurship is only contributing to economic growth in already advanced 
economies. For poor, developing countries, the implication is very similar to that found 
in the development economic literature: entrepreneurship does not matter.  
Consider for instance that the major conceptual approach towards defending the role of 
the entrepreneur in economic growth has been to see the entrepreneur as a conduit for 
innovation. This has its origins in Schumpeter’s description of the essential contribution 
of the entrepreneur as someone who causes continual disequilibrium in economy 
through ‘creative destruction’, i.e. radical innovation which leads to more efficient 
allocation of production factors and thus productivity improvements. This ‘radical 
innovation’ is widely seen in the literature as being more important than ‘replicative’ 
innovation for economic growth, although it is ‘replicative’ entrepreneurship that 
dominates in developing countries (see e.g. Baumol et al., 2007).  
That the entrepreneur’s essential contribution to economic growth is through innovation 
is confirmed in the most recent entrepreneurship literature. This literature is essentially 
an attempt to incorporate Schumpeter’s insights into the literature on endogenous 14 
 
economic growth. In this literature, which has extended the earlier work of Solow 
(1956) wherein a large part of the variation in cross-country growth rates could not be 
explained by traditional production factors such as capital and labour alone, and 
wherein technological change was essentially exogenous. By endogenizing 
technological change entrepreneurs are here seen as ‘knowledge filter’ that 
commercializes innovations. In the words of Audretsch et al. (2006: 5) 
‘entrepreneurship makes an important contribution to economic growth by providing a 
conduit for the spillover of knowledge that might otherwise have remained 
uncommercialized’. 
In most developing countries, where production takes place well within the 
technological frontier, the view is that economic growth is not ‘innovation driven’ and 
that replicative entrepreneurs abound. Such entrepreneurs are however apparently not 
terribly important for economic growth. As put by Baumol et al. (2007: 3)  
‘To be sure, replicative entrepreneurship is important in most economies 
because it represents a route out of poverty, a means by which people with little 
capital, education, or experience can earn a living. But if economic growth is the 
object of interest, then it is the innovative entrepreneur who matters’. 
This very much resonates with Banerjee and Duflo’s (2007) call not to ‘romanticize the 
penniless entrepreneurs’. 
Because radical innovations are not essential in poor economies to move the production 
and technological frontier outwards as in developed economies, the implication is, as in 
development economics, that entrepreneurship is not the binding constraint on 
economic growth and development. Indeed, small businesses owners, which ‘dominate 
the economic life of most developing nations’ (Gollin, 2008: 219) are in this literature 
not even considered entrepreneurs (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). 
A recent edited volume in the Edward Elgar entrepreneurship series focusing on 
entrepreneurship in emerging regions (Phan et al. 2008) comes to a broadly similar 
conclusion, namely that in poor economies entrepreneurs are not the binding constraint. 
They are not the ones who are essential for ‘kick-starting’ growth. As Phan et al. (2008: 
325) concludes: 
‘…studies of entrepreneurial regions across the world…have underscored the 
critical role of governments at different levels in the emergence of these 
regions...the magnitude of government influence, which is significant in the 
early stages of development, seems to decline in later stages relative to other 
factors… The explanations for this vary from the traditional factor substitution 
wherein government kick-starts the development of a sector, which then 
becomes attractive for private capital to accumulate, to the post-modern 
institutionalization, in which the development of such institutions as intellectual 
property regimes engender capital accumulation’. 
Thus, they find that in early stages of development, governments need to address more 
binding constraints on development such as market failures and institutional 
weaknesses. Their recognition of the importance of government in addressing market 
failures, kick-starting growth, and in the importance of institutional foundations or 15 
 
prerequisites for growth, is entirely consistent with both the early development 
economics literature, for instance Hirschman (1958) on linkages, Rosenstein-Rodan 
(1943) on the need for a ‘big push’, and also consistent with the more recent 
development economics literature on the need for good institutions (e.g. Rodrik, 2000; 
2008). 
This is as far as the conceptualization of entrepreneurship and economic growth and 
development is concerned. As far as the empirical evidence for the notion that 
entrepreneurship is good for economic growth and development is concerned, there may 
be even less of a leg to stand on. This is because even in the case of advanced 
economies, the empirical evidence remains at least in my interpretation, unconvincing. 
The jury is still out, and whether entrepreneurship is good for economic growth in 
developing countries may be a matter of belief. 
For instance, Nyström (2008) provides a summary of empirical tests of the relationship 
between entrepreneurship and economic growth. With the exception of three studies, the 
studies cited by Nyström (2008) are exclusively focusing on advanced economies. She 
lists 38 studies between 1996 and 2006 which quantify the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and economic performance. In these studies entrepreneurship is 
measured either by self-employment rates (most often), business ownership rates, early-
stage entrepreneurial activity (start-up activity), or even by the number of patents 
registered (to reflect the idea that it is ‘innovative’ entrepreneurship that really matters). 
Economic performance is measured using either employment, GDP growth, or 
productivity growth.  
The results of these 38 studies are in my view still unconvincing for four reasons.  
One is that they are a mixed bag of results. Results do not seem to be very robust. 
Definitions, times periods, quality of data, estimation methods—all seem to matter for 
the results. Entrepreneurship seems to matter in different ways in different context, 
suggesting that we do not understand the mechanism through which it operates. Some 
find outright that entrepreneurship does not matter for growth—for example Wong et al. 
(2005) using empirical evidence from 37 countries participating in the 2002 Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor finds significant evidence for ‘the existence of 
entrepreneurial activities that do not contribute to economic growth’. And Parker (2006: 
453) reports that there is no unambiguous empirical relationship between the rate of 
self-employment (often taken as a measure of entrepreneurship) and unemployment 
rates.  
A second reason is that these (macro level) studies are generally marred by weak 
methodologies. Many authors restrict their estimators to OLS in conjunction with using 
cross-section data. In such cases OLS estimators are often biased due to non-constant 
variances of the error terms; also, cross-section methods cannot control for unobserved 
heterogeneity amongst countries and are therefore subjected further to omitted variable 
bias. In addition they bias their estimates by including GDP per capita as control 
variable on the right hand side of their estimating equations together with their 
independent variables (such as institutional determinants of economic growth), thus not 
accounting for the high level of correlation between these variables.  16 
 
A third and related reason is that the evidence from mainly on macro level, cross-
sectional studies should not be considered ‘hard’ evidence. At least in this regard 
entrepreneurship scholars could learn from development economics, where a rich 
microeconomic tradition has arisen in recent years wherein theories and policy 
prescriptions are subjected as much as possible to randomized field trials. As put by 
Banerjee (2007: 115–116; quoted in Rodrik, 2008: 3–4)  
‘The beauty of randomized evaluations is that the results are what they are: we 
compare the outcome in the treatment with the outcome in the control group, see 
whether they are different, and if so by how much?’  
Whereas development economics have moved in the last decade or so away from the 
Washington Consensus towards an approach where there is less concern with cross-
country comparisons and identification of grand development narratives based on 
macroeconomic indicators, and towards an approach identifying the institutions that are 
appropriate in each different context and understanding and measuring the 
microeconomic relationships better, it would seem that entrepreneurship researchers are 
moving in the opposite direction to engage more in cross-country comparative work and 
macroeconomic relationships. 
A fourth reason is that empirical studies on the impact of some measure of 
‘entrepreneurship’ on some measure of ‘economic performance’ often leaves the 
impression of ‘data mining’. In fact it would seem that the very empirical definition of 
what entrepreneurship is, seems to be changing depending on empirical results. 
Disingenuously, scholars have been deeming an indicator as reflecting entrepreneurship 
only when it appears to be significantly and positively related to economic growth. 
Thus, when self-employment appeared to be insignificant in cross-country regressions, 
it was fairly quickly dismissed as not being a good measure of entrepreneurship. Then, 
when total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) of the GEM ran into the same, it again was 
quickly dismissed, and a distinction made between necessity entrepreneurship (which is 
not really seen as true entrepreneurship) and opportunity entrepreneurship. With 
measures of opportunity entrepreneurship now also not standing up to empirical 
scrutiny, some move to advocate the ratio between necessity and opportunity 
entrepreneurship as being the relevant measure of entrepreneurship.9 Others, when 
finding measures of innovation to be significantly correlated with development, quickly 
rush to claim these to be true indicators of entrepreneurship.  
Most of the studies included in the discussion above have focused on advanced 
economies. In the words of Bruton et al. (2008: 1) ‘entrepreneurship research can still 
be critiqued as almost exclusively focused on North American and European sites’.10 
                                                 
9  Because of the fundamental belief amongst entrepreneurship scholars that entrepreneurship is really 
indispensable for economic growth, and that consequently more advanced countries should be 
characterized by more and better entrepreneurship, the scholarly community was shocked that the 
GEM’s TEA found higher rates of entrepreneurship in developing countries.  
10 In an overview of the top entrepreneurship journals over the period 1990 to 2006, Bruton et al. (2008: 
3) finds that ‘less than one-half of 1 per cent of the articles in this period addressed entrepreneurship 
in emerging economies despite its critical role in the future of the world economy…the topic remains 
woefully underexamined’.  17 
 
They are therefore of limited use in answering the question whether entrepreneurship 
matters for economic growth and development in emerging and developing countries. 
To be precise, as far as these countries are concerned, there is really such a lack of 
empirical studies that perhaps nothing can as yet be said. Autio (2008: 2) has 
consequently remarked that ‘we actually know very little about whether and how 
entrepreneurship either contributes or does not contribute to economic growth in 
developing countries’.  
It may indeed not be a binding constraint. 
5  Entrepreneurship: Unpacking the Institutional Black Box? 
In the previous sections I had come to the conclusion that in spite of appearance of 
differences on the surface between the views of the development economics literature 
and the entrepreneurship literature, on a deeper level they may be both suggesting that 
entrepreneurship is not a binding constraint in poor countries. Institutions matter more 
for long run development going and, at least in the entrepreneurship literature, create the 
environment from where entrepreneurs can emerge to eventually drive economic growth 
and change the structure of economies. And as I had shown in Section 3, development 
economics has come full circle to again focus not only on economic growth, but on 
structural economic transformation as a prerequisite for economic development. 
As development economists and entrepreneurship scholars are converging on the 
importance of institutions, it is however unfortunately a fact that we do not know as 
much about institutions and how they affect the ‘transformation curve’, as we should. 
‘Institutions’ as explanation for development and entrepreneurship is still largely a 
‘black box’. This black box nature is a measure of our ignorance about the detailed 
mechanisms of development. A number of factors complicates the understanding of the 
role of institutions. 
For one, institutions are endogenous (Acemoglu 2003) and relatively little is known 
about the co-evolution of institutions, entrepreneurial behaviour, and a country’s stages 
of development (Fogel et al., 2006: 572). More advanced economies may be better able 
to ‘afford’ good institutions and more entrepreneurs. And entrepreneurs may shape 
institutions.  
Second, ‘obvious’ policy reforms to create good institutions such as mentioned above in 
the context of the Washington Consensus (e.g. property rights, rule of law, etc.) may 
only be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for development. Iyigun and Rodrik 
(2004) and Nayyar (2008) note that many countries where much progress have been 
made in adopting these during the 1990s experienced low and disappointing growth, 
whereas countries with less enthusiasm for the received wisdom (e.g., China and 
Vietnam) achieved higher growth rates. An furthermore, despite that fact that the USA 
is often held forth as a champion of unfettered markets and individual entrepreneurship, 
a closer reading of its development success shows that it has been a strong 
developmental state. As Lazonick (2009) points out ‘There is no shortage of 
entrepreneurial individualism in American-style capitalism, but its transformation into 
higher standards of living has depended critically on investments, protections and 
subsidies provided by the developmental state.’ 18 
 
Third, institutional reform itself is an ongoing, dynamic process (Estrin et al. 2006). It 
creates uncertainties which may have perverse consequences for the relationship 
between development and entrepreneurship, such as the entrenchment of former elites 
and a rise in rent-seeking behaviour. We do not know how to design good institutions 
that are relevant for a particular context. Often, paradoxically, ‘bad’ institutions have 
good outcomes and vice versa (Chang, 2007).  
Fourth, initial conditions may matter for the dynamics and success of institutional 
strengthening. These include the distribution of income and wealth before the 
commencement of institutional reforms and institutional building. Highly unequal 
societies may have a much ‘flatter’ transformation curve, i.e. would need many more 
additional entrepreneurs to have the same impact on growth than more equal countries. 
But this is speculative and needs much more research. 
Finally, we need to ask how understanding entrepreneurship better can lead to improved 
understanding of the relationship between institutions and, entrepreneurship and 
structural change. In this regard, UNU-WIDER started a project on entrepreneurship 
and economic development to ask, amongst others, how the institutional black box can 
be unpacked. In one of the contributions to this project, Gries and Naudé (2010) provide 
an endogenous growth model with microeconomic foundations to illustrate that 
entrepreneurs provide five essential roles in structural transformation. (1) they create 
new firms outside of the household, (2) they absorbe surplus labour from the traditional 
sector, (3) they provide innovative intermediate inputs to final goods producing firms, 
(4) they permit greater specialization in manufacturing, and (5), they raise productivity 
and employment in both the modern and traditional sectors. 
In each of these, the institutional setting may create binding constraints. In particular 
they use modelling tools from labour economics (specifically labour matching models) 
to match entrepreneurial opportunities in the modern sector, with entrepreneurial 
abilities. Herein, the idea that markets play an important role in facilitating the 
appropriate matching (application) of entrepreneurial ability, is important. The 
implication is that markets may fail to match entrepreneurial talent with opportunities, 
which will have knock-on effects for all of the roles of the entrepreneur in structural 
transformation. Thus, failure in an economy to match entrepreneurial talent with 
opportunities will flatten the transformation curve, making efforts even to increase the 
supply of entrepreneurship, without impact. Their model, and further extensions and 
elaborations to their model, similarly offers to scope to study other market and state 
failures as binding constraints in structural transformation. 
Finally, while entrepreneurs and institutions may influence structural transformation, 
the very process of structural transformation may change the nature and concept of 
entrepreneurship so that entrepreneurship may be itself endogenous in the development 
process. Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) realized this when they showed that if a 
particular economy produces a limited range of intermediate goods, the final goods 
sector will use ‘primitive’ production methods and will have little demand for 
sophisticated, new inputs. This will in turn lead to lower incentives for potential 
entrepreneurs to start-up new firms (1996: 34). The economy can get stuck in such an 
underdevelopment trap with primitive production in its (small) modern sector. As in 
other underdevelopment traps discussed in the early development economics literature, 
this suggests the case for state intervention and institutions to enable new start-ups to 19 
 
produce new intermediate goods. This in turn will induce final good producers to 
demand more of these, which will again in turn improve the incentives for other 
entrepreneurs to enter the market for more sophisticated intermediate inputs.  
6 Concluding  remarks 
Joseph Schumpeter was much concerned about economic development and structural 
changes, his 1912 book being entitled The Theory of Economic Development 
(translated in 1934). But he had little direct influence on development economics as 
subject as it developed after the Second World War. He did however, have a huge 
influence on the field of entrepreneurship, but perhaps ironically, more in terms of 
stimulating research on how and why entrepreneurs innovate, than on their impact on 
economic development. The latter remains a challenge to both fields.  
In this paper it was argued that the essence of the challenge is to study entrepreneurship 
as an attempt at unpacking the ‘black box’ of institutions, given that both fields are now 
converging on the centrality of institutions in explaining both outcomes in terms of 
entrepreneurship and economic development. Entrepreneurship is not likely to be a 
binding constraint on economic development and structural change in the poorest 
countries, but it may improve our understanding of the truly binding constraints. 
By understanding better the role of entrepreneurship as a conduit through which binding 
institutional constraints are transmitted to economic outcomes may assist in the design 
of context-specific institutions. It may illuminate the impact of institutions on the nature 
and concept of entrepreneurship, and particularly on the role of entrepreneurship in 
innovation in developing countries. It may also assist in understanding how institutional 
change and institutional design can come about, because entrepreneurs are not passive 
actors under externally imposed institutional frameworks, but work actively to change 
these institutional frameworks—and this impact may be even more important in 
developing countries. This circular, potentially unstable and unpredictable interaction 
between institutions and entrepreneurship is dynamically rich in a manner which Joseph 
Schumpeter would have appreciated. The time has come for a closer integration of 
entrepreneurship and development economics. 20 
 
Appendix  
Appendix Table 1: Development Economists and Entrepreneurship: Views During the Development Consensus Phase, 1940s–1980 
Key Contributor 
(in chronological order) 
Concerns in development  Views on (and implications for) entrepreneurship 
Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan (1943) 
Structural change: Industrialization is necessary for growth 
(economies of scale, labour specialization, etc). But a ‘big push’ is 
needed to overcome a low level equilibrium trap. 
No explicit views. But implies that planned investment on a 
large scale is needed because markets and uncoordinated 
entrepreneurs cannot provide it. 
Later this idea was taken up by others to argue for 
government support in encouraging entrepreneurial cluster 
formation and to show how spillovers matter for 
entrepreneurial performance. 
W. Arthur Lewis (1954)  Structural change: It is importance for countries to transform from 
rural/agriculture-based economies to modern, industrial-based 
economies. 
Market failures: These result in savings in developing countries 
being inadequate to finance investment. 
 
The ‘capitalist’ is essential in the transformation by investing 
in the modern sector in capital which augments labour, and in 
saving the surplus from modern production. 
It is not, however, the supply of capitalists (and by implication 
of entrepreneurship) which constrains the process of 
transformation, but of surplus labour. Once surplus labour 
has been transferred, structural change is completed and 
wages (equaling the marginal product of labour) equalized 
across labour markets. 
Hollis B. Chenery 
(1955; 1975) 
Structural change: Industrialization is a prerogative for 
development. Lagging countries could leapfrog development. 
Market failures: The consequences of economic growth are not 
equally distributed. Poverty traps may exist 
No explicit views.  
But later, others will argue that in leapfrogging development, 
entrepreneurs in lagging countries may play a potentially 
important role by imitating and copying technology from 
advanced countries. 21 
 
Gunnar Myrdal (1957)  Structural change: Urban-based industrialization is important for 
development. However, agglomeration and cumulative causation 
creates path dependencies in development. 
Market failures: These are ubiquitous in developing countries. He 
argues the need for a state intervention, but sees corruption and 
rent-seeking (the ‘soft state’) as a significant obstacle to 
development. 
International inequality: Recognizes the need to overcome 
international dependency. 
His early works focused on constraints on African-American 
entrepreneurship. He did not consider entrepreneurship as 




Structural change: Can be promoted through ‘unbalanced’ growth, 
meaning promoting a targeted, leading sector. 
Market failures: Coordination failures are widespread in 
underdevelopment; State targeting of sectors with forward and 
backward linkages are therefore needed. 
International dimension: To participate in global economy countries 
need to find local-based solutions to underdevelopment. Binding 
constraints differ amongst countries. 
The state needs to support certain type of entrepreneurial 
activities—not all—by creating incentives (‘inducement 
mechanisms’) for ‘capital and entrepreneurship’. 
Coordination failures make returns to individual 
entrepreneurs low, i.e. they reduce opportunities for private 
investment. 
Capital is not lacking, but willingness to take risk is. 
Raul Prebisch (1959)  Structural change: Industrialization important, but hindered by 
deteriorating terms of trade of developing countries. 
Market failure: This creates the need for the state to push 
structural change and interfere in trade to improve a country’s 
terms of trade. Advocates protectionism. 
International dimension: The existing centre-periphery relations 
which characterizes the global economy is to the disadvantage of 
developing countries and the international division of labour. 




Structural change: As ‘late’ industrializers the challenge for 
developing countries is to catch up. They can leapfrog and skip 
stages in the development process by importing technology. He is 
thus critical of those, like Rostow (1960) who sees development as 
needing to go through specific fixed stages. 
Market failure: The state is needed to overcome these in financial 
and investment; emphasized importance of institutions, particularly 
financial institutions. 
Is seen as having advocated ‘surrogate’ entrepreneurship by 
the state, in order to force industrialization. 
Later, financial constraints will be identified by many as 
seriously inhibiting the start-up rate and growth of 
entrepreneurial firms. 
Hans Singer (1964)  Structural change: Developing countries should diversify out of 
primary production.  
Economic growth: Science, technology, innovation, and human 
capital are important. But no blueprints for development exists as 
each country’s circumstances are unique. 
Influenced by Schumpeter in terms of his advocacy of the 
importance of innovation in driving growth and making 
diversification possible. 
Nicholas Kaldor (1966)  Structural change: Development goes through three different 
stages, the underdevelopment stage, the intermediate stage, and 
the mature stage. Industrialization is necessary for development. 
International dimension: Exporting is necessary if poorer countries 
are to industrialize, as they need larger markets in order to 
specialize and generate increase returns to scale in production. 
But, barriers in international trade are a hindrance.  
Entrepreneurship is not a binding constraint. Rather it is 
lacking of being able to achieve economies of scale and 
specialization which is hindering industrialization in 
developing countries. 23 
 
Michael Lipton (1968)  Structural change: Warns against the neglect of agriculture in 
promoting industrial development. 
Market failure: Point to inequalities in land distribution and 
riskiness of agriculture as failures which inhibits agricultural 
productivity. 
Suggest that farmers in developing countries act as 
entrepreneurs who do not maximize profit. 
Identify rural entrepreneurship as limited by lack of access to 
land (wealth). 
Although production is small scale (small firm size), it is often 
an important (efficient) response to conditions. 
Harvey Leibenstein 
(1968) 
Not a ‘development economist’ as such, he introduced the concept 
of ‘x-efficiency’. However, he was one of the few economist of the 
era who deemed entrepreneurship as being important for 
economic development. 
Market failure: Market ‘imperfections’ are extensive and create a 
need for entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurs are needed to fulfill a ‘gap-filling’ role in 
imperfect markets. The supply may be constrained by lack of 
capabilities, opportunity costs, etc.  
Distinguish between routine entrepreneurship (e.g. 
management) and Schumpeterian entrepreneurship. 
Ester Boserup (1970)  Structural change: Rural-urban migration and the linkages 
between agriculture and industry important in the development 
process. 
Economic growth: Emphasized the importance of population 
growth, densities, and agglomeration, and of these as necessary 
for technological innovation. 
Institutional context: Gender inequalities widespread, role of 
informality in developing countries.  
Highlighted the intense activity of women as entrepreneurs in 






Structural change: ‘Commercialization’ is needed for 
industrialization. 
Market failure: Warns against unregulated financial markets and 
financial crises. 
Recognize role of entrepreneur in industrialization and 
conditions to empower entrepreneurs. But recognize possible 
dangers of entrepreneurial behavior (e.g. in financial 
markets) 
Nathan Leff (1979)  Market failure: Without regulation and state intervention, 
entrepreneurship can be too ‘effective’, undermining economic 
growth through market concentration and inequality. 
Explicitly considers the role of the entrepreneur. Concludes 
that entrepreneurship is not a binding constraint, but that 

















Appendix Table 2: Development Economists and Entrepreneurship: Views During the Washington Consensus phase, 1981–2000 
Key Contributor 
(in chronological order) 
Key concerns in development  Views on / Implications for entrepreneurship 
Robert Chambers 
(1981) 
Conceptual: Defined ‘sustainable livelihoods’, which should be the 
target of development policy; focus on understanding poverty in its 
many dimensions. 
Government failure: Critical of top-down national planning; 
emphasize need for participatory planning; local solutions, local 
knowledge needed. 
Entrepreneurial behaviour important for rural development 
and smallscale farming, as vehicle out of poverty. 
Governments do not often understand the requirements of 
smallscale informal entrepreneurs. 
Jagdish Bhagwati 
(1982) 
Economic growth: Developing countries need to open up to trade 
and export promotion. 
Government failures: Government interference/dirigisme creates 
incentives for rent-seeking (directly unproductive activities). 
Not directly concerned with entrepreneurs, but his analysis 
of rent-seeking predates ideas in entrepreneurship about 
institutional incentives which leads to skewed allocation of 
entrepreneurial talent towards unproductive activities. 
Deepak Lal (1983)  Economic growth: Classical liberalism (the invisible hand) is 
necessary for growth. Openness, deregulation, and liberalization of 
markets are needed. 
Government failures: Predator states reduce the contribution which 
entrepreneurs can make. The state needs to be rolled back for 
private sector development to take place. 
Entrepreneurship is ubiquitous across time and countries. 
Entrepreneurs take risks and introduce novelty, but state 
predation limits their contribution. Institutions, such as 
property rights and societal attitudes accepting of 
entrepreneurs are necessary for extensive growth. 
Joseph Stiglitz (1986)  Market failure: Imperfections in information (asymmetric) leads to 
market failures. This implies a role for government 
Not directly concerned with entrepreneurs, but his work has 
implications for instance in understanding the nature of 
financial constraints on start-ups. 
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Robert Barro (1996)  Economic growth: Concerned with the cross-country empirical 
evidence on the determinants of growth and convergence between 
rich and poor countries. Emphasizes property rights and free 
markets as key ‘institutions’ for economic development. 
Not directly concerned with entrepreneurs, but his emphasis 
on property rights and other legal bases for growth implies 
that entrepreneurs (firms) will function better under certain 
institutional conditions. 
Mancur Olson (1996)  Economic growth: Growth depends on institutional context. 
Emphasizes the importance of contract rights and collective action. 
Market and government failures: Both of these keep countries 
underdeveloped—it is not the size of government that matters, but 
the structure of incentives it creates and whether it can address or 
worsen market failures. 
Firms (i.e. entrepreneurs) in developing countries act 
rationally, even under difficult conditions. However, this does 
not necessarily generate ‘socially efficient outcomes’. 
Cultural differences (including differences in entrepreneurial 






Appendix Table 3: Development Economists and Entrepreneurship: Views during the Post Washington Period, 2000–present 
Key Contributor 
(in chronological order) 
Key concerns in development  Views on / Implications for entrepreneurship 
Joseph Stiglitz (1998; 
2002) 
Market failures: The role of the state is necessary as there are market 
failures, especially in financial markets. Competition and regulation of 
private sector activity is needed to avoid ‘market fundamentalism’. The 
state need to be focused and effective. 
International: Globalization in its current form is harmful to development. 
The international development institutions (IMF, World Bank) need to be 
redesigned. 
Financial markets are important for entrepreneurship. 
A growing number of studies on the relationship 
between entrepreneurship and finance refer to Stiglitz’ 
work, and tend to suggest an important supervisory 
and regulatory role for government. 
Amartya Sen (2000)  Conceptual: What is development? How can it be measured? Human 
development index, hunger and food security, gender inequalities, 
freedom as development. 
Return to poverty orientation in development focus. 
People are not ‘rational fools’. Development is more 
than just growth and people are motivated by more 
than just profit-seeking. Freedom is a good in itself, 
not just a means to an end. 
Daron Acemoglu (2003)  Economic Growth: Productivity and growth differences between countries 
are due to the riskiness of investment, investments in human capital, and 
technology. These in turn depend on the quality of institutions. 
Government failure: Predatory governments have a negative impact on 
growth. Proper institutions are needed to safeguard property rights. But 
this does not necessarily mean small government; rather strong, 
democratically accountable governments are best for development. 
Institutions create incentives which influence the 
allocation of talent.  
Many productive activities in poor countries are often 
subject to undiversifiable risk. 
Jeffrey Sachs (2003; 
2005) 
Economic Growth: Developing countries are stuck in a poverty trap. A ‘big 
push’ is needed to overcome many of the factors causing this trap. 
Increasing international aid to developing countries can play an important 
role in achieving this. It is not only institutions that are important: 
Entrepreneurship is an important vehicle out of 
poverty; International aid projects should encourage 
rural entrepreneurship in the poorest countries. 28 
 
geographic factors are important in themselves in explaining global 
inequality and poverty. 
International: Critical of the role of IMF and World Bank in global 
development. Promote the Millennium Development Goals as targets for 
international development. 
Ha-Joon Chang (2007)  Structural change: Industrialization remains indispensable, but difficult to 
attain for developing countries are constrained in options (kicking away 
the ladder). 
Market failure: Intervention is needed to foster industrialization. 
International: Inappropriateness of ‘global-standard’ institutions for 
development. 
Calls for ‘state entrepreneurship’. This is a state that 
provides a vision and mobilizes resources for 
achieving that vision. 
Paul Collier (2007)  Market failures: Trade and globalization important mechanisms to escape 
poverty, but government assistance needed.  
Government failures: Accountable and transparent government needed. 
State failure by lack hereof as elites enrich themselves. Conflict may 
necessitate outside interference. Democracy does not guarantee growth. 
International: Trade preferences needed for the poorest to jump-start their 
growth. Generally globalization is good for development. 
Entrepreneurs need opportunities, but governments 
can destroy opportunities. 
Dani Rodrik (2007)  Market failures: Institutions are important for growth and development. 
However, growth may start without appropriate institutions, but will require 
such institutions to be sustained. 
Structural change: Industrialization is central in development. This needs a 
‘strategic partnership’ between state and private sector. 
The state should, through industrial policy, entice 
entrepreneurs to ‘discover’ what an economy is good 
at producing. 
Institutional and policy reforms could have negative 
impacts on growth if pre-existing entrepreneurial 
activity is strong, and vice versa (see Iyigun and 
Rodrik, 2004). 29 
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